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AN END TO RANSOM: THE CASE FOR AMENDING THE
BAIL PROVISION OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
BENNETT H. BRUMMER* AND BRUCE S. ROGOW**
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliance on money bail as a primary means of assuring the pres-
ence of an accused in court has been the focus of legislative, judicial,
academic, and civic criticism for many years. Reform proposals
have been submitted to the state legislature repeatedly over the past
ten years,' only to be killed by the insurance company lobby repre-
senting the state's bail bondsmen. The Supreme Court of Florida
has twice revised its rule of court relating to pretrial release and
both times rejected suggestions that the revision conform to modern
concepts of pretrial release, due process, and equal protection.' Fed-
eral litigation attacking Florida's money bail scheme as applied to
indigents has, thus far, proven no more effective than other ap-
proaches. Against this background, the proposal by the Constitution
Revision Commission to modernize the pretrial release provision of
the Florida Constitution becomes highly significant as an immedi-
ate and effective reform measure, the fate of which will be deter-
mined by the electorate. This article will address the legal underpin-
nings of our system of pretrial release, the need for reform of that
system, and certain procedural implications of reform.
II. FLORIDA'S MONEY BAIL SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
Article I, section 14 of the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitu-
tion provides the foundation of state law relating to the availability
and conditions of bail pending trial:
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** Professor, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. B.B.A. 1961, University of
Miami; J.D. 1963, University of Florida.
1. See generally R. Askew, Recommended Program to the 1976 Florida Legislature at 20
(on file in Governor's Office):
Also, I am asking you once again to ignore the pleas of those who prey on the
unfortunate and adopt a comprehensive reform of our bail system in this 'State as
proposed by Senator George Firestone. Our present system of money bail discrimi-
nates against the poor, and it burdens the taxpayers with the cost of detaining those
awaiting trial who need not be in jail. There is no reason why it should not be
changed by this Legislature.
2. The Florida Bar, 343 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1977); In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
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Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or
violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to
release on reasonable bail with sufficient surety unless charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprison-
ment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.,
From 1973 to 1977, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
flected a heavy emphasis on money bail but noted the existence of
judicial discretion to release an accused on his own recognizance.4
Effective July 1, 1977, however, the rules were amended.
The present rule relating to pretrial release expressly recognizes
several forms of release, ranging from personal recognizance to
money bail.5 This rule may be considered an improvement over its
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
4. Hearing at First Appearance. The purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's
appearance. The judge shall, therefore, at the defendant's first appearance, con-
sider all available relevant factors to determine whether bail is necessary to assure
the defendant's appearance and, if so, the amount of bail. The judge may, in his
discretion, release a defendant on his own recognizance.
In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 82 (Fla. 1972) (rule 3.130(b)(4)).
5.
RULE 3.130. PRE-TRIAL RELEASE
(a) Offenses Less Than Capital. All persons in custody for the commission of
an offense unless it is a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprison-
ment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great shall be entitled
as of right to be admitted to bail before conviction. After conviction bail may be
granted by either the trial or appellate court.
(b) First Appearance.
(4) Hearing at First Appearance.
(i) The purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's appearance. For the
purpose of this rule, bail is defined as any of the following forms of release:
(1) Personal recognizance of the defendant;
(2) Execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the
judge;
(3) Placing the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(4) Placing restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the defen-
dant during the period of release;
(5) Requiring the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(6) Imposing any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap-
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the defendant return to
custody after specified hours.
(ii) The judge shall at the defendant's first appearance consider all avail-
able relevant factors to determine what form of release is necessary to assure
the defendant's appearance. If a monetary bail is required, then the judge
shall determine the amount.
(iii) In determining which form of release will reasonably assure appear-
ance, the judge shall, on the basis of available information, take into account
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evi-
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predecessor insofar as it expressly reflects the wide range of alterna-
tives available. However, the various forms of release now set forth
in the rule do not, as a practical matter, provide a trial judge with
any new alternatives.
Florida law recognizes no presumption in favor of nonfinancial
bail alternatives.' Thus, the state bears no burden of proof to estab-
lish that all forms of pretrial release, short of secured money bail,
would be insufficient to guarantee appearance in court by the ac-
cused. Likewise, the trial judge is not required to examine and ex-
haust all nonfinancial bail alternatives before setting money bail.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
recently declared that fourteenth amendment due process and equal
protection require meaningful consideration of nonfinancial condi-
tions of release for those who have difficulty in posting money bail.'
Other decisions make clear that the Federal Constitution requires
a presumption in favor of the least restrictive condition of release
which will assure a defendant's appearance at trial.' Furthermore,
the government must bear the burden of proving that a more restric-
tive condition is needed. Therefore, when the trial judge exercises
his discretion to determine which condition to impose, he must look
first to each succeedingly less restrictive alternative.'
The Florida Constitution Revision Commission has proposed the
following for consideration by the electorate on the November ballot
as part of article I of the Florida Constitution:
dence against the defendant, the defendant's family ties, employment, fin-
ancial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence
in the community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at
court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at
court proceedings.
(iv) Information stated in, or offered in connection with, any order en-
tered pursuant to this rule need not strictly conform to the rules of evidence.
The Florida Bar, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1250-51 (Fla. 1977).
6. The committee note to the new pretrial release rule accurately observes that, under the
rule, there is no presumption in favor of release on recognizance or unsecured appearance,
and the form of release is within the sound discretion of the judge. The note indicates that
the judge should exercise his discretion to impose the least restrictive alternative which will
ensure the defendant's appearance. Id. at 1251. However, under Florida law, the committee
note is not part of the rule and is not binding on the judge in any way. State ex rel. Evans v.
Chappel, 308 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975); In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 513
(Fla. 1973).
7. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
8. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 470 n.11
(5th Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F.
Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
9. This concept was also incorporated into the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a) (1976).
19781
778 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:775
Section 14. Release prior to trial -Bi4--Until adjudged guilty,
every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or
county ordinance shall be released upon conditions reasonable
under the circumstances to secure his appearance at future court
proceedings including monetary bail when no other method is
adequate. entitled-teleese-on-eaon abl bfi4-with -uffieient, sur-
ety-urnlese No person charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment shall be released prior to trial
when -ad the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great. 0
This proposal is apparently designed to distinguish between mon-
etary and non-monetary conditions of release and to create a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the latter." This represents a
small-but highly significant-shift in Florida's bail system.
III. CRITICISM OF FLORIDA'S PRESENT MONETARY BAIL SYSTEM
A. Interference with the Liberty and Other Fundamental Rights
of Accused Persons
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Stan-
dards and Goals (NACCJSG) has accurately described the nature
of the money bail system: "In theory, money bail is intended to
insure the presence of the accused for trial. In practice, it makes
release prior to trial depend not on the risk of nonappearance but
on the financial resources of the accused.' 2
Based solely on an individual's wealth, the monetary bail system,
as presently enforced, deprives accused persons of a multitude of
fundamental rights.
The conditions under which pretrial detainees are incarcerated
are often so egregious that they are violative of constitutional stan-
dards."3 And, of course, the incarceration per se has a direct, adverse
impact on virtually all aspects of the broad range of "liberty" pro-
10. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 14 (May 11, 1978). Words struck through are
deletions from the existing section. Italicized words are additions.
11. The proposal does not address the constitutional problems relating to bail in capital
or life cases. State and federal courts have recently held that, at least with regard to defen-
dants charged with crimes punishable by life imprisonment, due process and equal protection
require that Florida afford a bail hearing without regard to whether the proof is evident or
the presumption is great. Riley v. Sundstrom, No. 78-1276 (S.D. Fla. April 14, 1978); Escan-
dar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1977); State v. McIntosh, No. 77-27393 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Sept. 30, 1977).
12. Proceedings of the National Conference on Criminal Justice, Commentary on Correc-
tions Standard 4.4, Alternatives to Pretrial Detention at 120-21 [hereinafter cited as Correc-
tions Standard 4.4].
13. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1192 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 572 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir.' 1978) (en banc).
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tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, as well as on the ability to prepare and
present a defense.
Commonly, the conditions under which pretrial detainees are in-
carcerated are so extremely poor that they have been held to violate
due process and equal protection standards and to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment." Pretrial detainees are often forced to
survive at the most minimal level of human existence and are often
subjected to overcrowding, excessive noise, temperature extremes,
unpalatable food, sexual assaults, and other acts of violence. They
are exposed, on an around-the-clock basis, to persons of wideranging
criminal experience. They are often housed, too, with persons re-
quiring treatment for severe mental illness and narcotics addiction.
Pretrial incarceration totally disrupts the life of an accused per-
son. It "may imperil [his] job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships."'" Detainees lose the ability to move
about freely, to have any meaningful contact with others, and to
care for their families. The privations resulting from pretrial incar-
ceration entail the loss of fundamental "personal freedom in the
most immediate and literal sense of those words."' 6 It is easy to lose
sight of the fact that pretrial incarceration involves deprivation of
"the most basic [right] of all, since what is at stake is no less than
the freedom to be free."'" Subsumed under that basic right is the
freedom to walk about,'" to travel," and to associate freely with
persons of one's own choice 20-all freedoms of which a detainee is
deprived without any determination of guilt.
A particularly keen deprivation forced upon detainees is the loss
of "the right to be let alone," which Justice Brandeis called "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."' Indeed, the right of privacy has been recognized as one of
14. See Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.
Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in relevant part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) and 527 F.2d 1041
(2d Cir. 1975). See also cases cited in Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1191 n.6 (5th Cir.
1977), modified, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
15. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
16. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
998 (1972).
17. Id. at 1340.
18. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass. 1973).
19. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
20. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the fundamental values which the Bill of Rights was designed to
protect.2
Pretrial detainees are also denied certain basic rights relating to
the preparation and presentation of their cases. Their detention
imposes severe restrictions on their ability to exercise their' right to
marshal evidence and witnesses, and to confer adequately with
counsel prior to trial. The United States Supreme Court elaborated
on this problem in Smith v. Hooey:
Confined in a prison . . . [a detainee's] ability to confer with
potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of their wherea-
bouts, is obviously impaired. And, while "evidence and witnesses
disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective," a
man isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative
efforts to mitigate these erosive effects of the passage of time.2
The problems an indigent detainee faces in preparing a defense
are exacerbated by the physical conditions of incarceration. Con-
tacts with the outside world are extremely limited. Telephone and
visiting privileges are restricted, affording very limited opportunity
to consult privately with counsel, family, or friends. Attorneys at-
tempting to consult with their clients in jail are often forced to wait
long periods of time to see them. This, of course, tends to limit the
frequency of their visits. Generally, there are only a few private
attorney-client interview rooms available in jails. This also discour-
ages visits.
Pretrial detention also prevents the accused from being able to
obtain employment, display an ability to remain drug-free (if that
ability is relevant to his case), enter a therapeutic community, or
explore any of the number of alternatives which would demonstrate
repentance and the beginnings of rehabilitation. He can only prom-
ise such accomplishments and, thus, is less able to make a persu-
asive case for minimizing criminal sanctions in the event of a guilty
plea or conviction.
Pretrial detainees are often confined in an inhumane jail under
conditions which are more egregious than those under which con-
22. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651-52 (1972); Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law,
5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 631 (1977).
23. 393 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1969) (quoting Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for
Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 769 (1968)). See also Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 8 (1951): "Without this conditional privilege [of pretrial freedom], even those wrong-
ly accused are punished by a period of imprisonment while awaiting trial and are handi-
capped in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a defense."
[Jackson and Frankfurter, JJ., concurring.]
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victed prisoners are confined. It is well established that pretrial
detainees do not stand on the same footing as convicted persons
and, therefore, must be subjected to the least restrictive conditions
of confinement necessary to assure their presence at trial. 24 How-
ever, in Dade County, for example, pretrial detainees continue to be
incarcerated due solely to their poverty and, while incarcerated,
continue to be housed with convicts and subjected to the same
punitive conditions.
Not surprisingly, pretrial detention tends to coerce guilty pleas.
The prosecutor knows that the longer the accused remains in jail
awaiting trial, the more likely the accused will be to plead guilty.
Severely hampered in preparing a defense and suffering from his
incarceration, a pretrial detainee is much more likely to plead guilty
in order to bring his case to a conclusion.
If the accused refuses to accept the prosecutor's plea offer and
continues to maintain his innocence, he faces the prejudicial pros-
pect of going to trial as an incarcerated person. The presiding judge
and trial jury are inevitably confronted with this information be-
cause the pretrial detainee enters the courtroom from the side or
front, escorted by a jail guard, rather than from the rear by himself.
This cannot help but adversely influence the judge and jury, who
must try and sentence the accused.
Because of these severe restrictions on the defendant's ability to
present a defense, it is not at all surprising that pretrial detainees
are convicted more often and sentenced more harshly than those
who are wealthy enough to post bail and obtain their release from
custody. The American Bar Association Project on Standards For
Criminal Justice reports as follows:
The consequences of pretrial detention are grave. Defendants
presumed innocent are subjected to the psychological and physi-
cal deprivations of jail life, usually under more onerous conditions
than are imposed on convicted defendants. The jailed defendant
loses his job if he has one and is prevented from contributing to
the preparation of his defense. Equally important, the burden of
his detention frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of
his family. Moreover, there is strong evidence that a defendant's
failure to secure pretrial release has an adverse effect on the out-
come of his case. Studies in Philadelphia, the District of Columbia
and New York all indicate that the conviction rate for jailed defen-
24. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Tyrrell
v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 470 n.ll (5th
Cir. 1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
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dants materially exceeds that of bailed defendants. For example,
of defendants charged with grand larceny forty-three percent of
those on bail pending trial were convicted while seventy-two per-
cent of those in jail were convicted. In terms of the sentence im-
posed on convicted persons, the bailed defendant is far more likely
to receive probation; his jailed counterpart, having been unable to
demonstrate his reliability under supervision, more frequently goes
to prison. Of course some of the factors, such as strong evidence of
guilt or a long criminal record, that lead to high bail and hence
detention, will also cause a court to find the defendant guilty and
to sentence him to prison rather than to give him probation. But
a recent study which attempted to hold other causative factors
constant indicates that there is a strong relationship between de-
tention and unfavorable disposition.35
The Supreme Court of the United States has aptly summarized
the devastating consequences of the imprisonment of an accused
before his trial:
If an accused cannot make bail, he is generally confined. . . in
a local jail. This contributes to the overcrowding and generally
deplorable state of those institutions. Lengthy exposure to these
conditions "has a destructive effect on human character and
makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much more
difficult." At times the result may even be violent rioting.
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental im-
pact on the individual. If often means loss of a job; it disrupts
family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no
recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is
simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is
hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or
otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing these consequences on
anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious. It is especially
unfortunate to impose them on those persons who are ultimately
found to be innocent. 26
Thus, the monetary bail system constitutes a drastic interference
with fundamental rights of the accused.
25. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 2-3 (1968) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited
as ABA RELEASE STANDARDS].
26. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520, 532-33 (1972).
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B. Failure to Serve a Compelling Governmental Interest with the
Least Restrictive Means Available
Since Florida's monetary bail system drastically interferes with
fundamental freedoms, the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution mandates that the state establish that its
scheme (1) promotes a "compelling governmental interest"" and
(2) does so with means which are "structured with 'precision'" and
"'tailored' narrowly to serve [its] legitimate objectives .... ,,21
These requisite factors constitute the familiar standard for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose. 9
Florida's monetary bail system wholly fails to meet these federal
constitutional standards. First, it fails to promote the compelling
governmental interest in question, namely, assuring the appearance
of accused persons at trial. Second, it fails to achieve its objective
with the least restrictive means available and, thus, unnecessarily
burdens a host of fundamental freedoms of the accused.
It is well established that the only legitimate governmental inter-
est served by bail is to assure the presence of the accused at trial.3
The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize as much in rule
3.130(b)(4)(i): "The purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's
appearance." Ironically, though, the posting of monetary bail does
little or nothing to ensure that the accused will appear in court and
comply with court orders. The National Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards has said that
Society has a rightful interest in insuring that persons accused
of crimes are available for trial. The accused on the other hand is
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
28. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
29. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted). See also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972): "In pursuing [an] important interest, the State cannot
choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. ...
[If there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference."
30. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir.
1976).
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presumed innocent and should not be detained unless he repre-
sents a substantial risk of not appearing when required. In most
instances, money bail is irrelevant in protecting or promoting ei-
ther interest.3'
If the accused pays a bond premium to a bail bondsman, the
premium will not be returned, even if the accused appears in court
as required.32 Thus, once he has paid the bondsman, the accused has
absolutely no financial incentive to appear for his trial. 33
If the accused posts a bond, with or without giving collateral to a
bondsman, he may very well regard the forefeiture of the bond or
collateral as a small price to pay for his freedom and thus fail to
appear at his trial. A cash bond is not required under Florida law
and is seldom used. Furthermore, it is totally discretionary under
Florida law for a bail bondsman to require collateral. Many do not.3'
When a bondsman demands sufficient collateral, the bondsman is
insulated from financial loss and thus has no financial interest in
assuring the presence of a recalcitrant defendant. Thus, the basic
premise of the monetary bail system-"that risk of financial loss is
necessary to prevent defendants from fleeing prosecution-is itself
of doubtful validity.
'35
Florida's monetary bail system fails to require the use of the least
restrictive means available to achieve its avowed objective. Al-
though Florida's latest rule of court relating to pretrial release pro-
vides for a number of nonfinancial conditions of release, 36 it guaran-
tees only the right to monetary bail. If an accused is too poor to post
money bail, and the court does not see fit to impose any of the non-
monetary alternatives, the accused must remain in jail (although
supposedly presumed innocent) until his case is concluded.
31. Corrections Standard 4.4, supra note 12, at 121 (emphasis added).
32. Even if the defendant appears as required and the charges against him are dismissed,
he must bear the cost of the bail bond premium. Dade County v. Baker, 356 So. 2d 65 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Holton v. State, 311 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In
holding that the expense of a bail bond premium is not a taxable cost under Florida law, the
Holton court noted the "staggering expense" which would have been incurred by the county
if the court had ruled to the contrary. Id. at 712. This "staggering expense," of course, is
presently being borne by individual defendants.
33. See Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concur-
ring): "[Ulnder the professional bondsman system the only one who loses money for non-
appearance is the professional bondsman, the money paid to obtain the bond being lost to
the defendant in any event."
34. In this regard, the NACCJSG has observed that "[tihe extent to which the accused
is financially committed to appear is determined by the amount of collateral the bail bonds-
man requires for writing the bond, not how high the bail is set." Corrections Standard 4.4,
supra note 12, at 121.
35. ABA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at 1.
36. See note 5 supra.
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The present bail system does not require that nonfinancial bail
alternatives be fairly examined by the court to determine if they will
assure the accused's appearance at trial. Moreover, these alterna-
tives need not be exhausted before money bail can be set. When a
court sets money bail for an indigent person, no time limit is placed
on the accused's incarceration after which he must be released on
nonfinancial bail. Nor is there any automatic reexamination of the
bail decision by the court within a specified time for an indigent
defendant who has failed to secure his release.
IV. THE CONSTrrUTION REVISION COMMISSION PROPOSAL
The state has a substantial, even compelling, interest in assuring
the appearance of all accused persons at trial. 7 The proposed
amendment would require only that the trial judge use the least
restrictive means available to ensure a defendant's appearance at
trial.3" The court would be prohibited from using money bail as the
condition for pretrial release in those cases in which a nonfinancial
condition of release would suffice. The commission proposal would
create a rebuttable presumption that the accused is entitled to re-
lease on his own recognizance or some other nonfinancial bail alter-
native.
This would be new for Florida, but there is nothing novel in this
approach. The American Bar Association has stated unequivocally
that "[iut should be presumed that the defendant is entitled to be
released on order to appear or on his own recognizance," and that
"[m]oney bail should be set only when it is found that no other
conditions on release will reasonably assure the defendant's ap-
pearance in court. '39
Also, the federal government, in enacting the Bail Reform Act of
1966,40 recognized this presumption of release on recognizance as
inherent in the presumption of innocence: "Any person charged
with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall
.. .be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance
or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond ... unless
. . .such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required."" Legislative history makes clear that this lan-
guage was intended to give effect to the presumption of innocence.
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:
37. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
38. For the text of the proposal, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
39. ABA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at 54, 58 (standards 5.1(a) and 5.3(a)).
40. Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 214 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3151 (1976)).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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The principle that a person is presumed innocent until proven
guilty by a court of law is perhaps the most basic concept of Ameri-
can criminal justice. A corollary of this presumption of innocence
is that a person accused of crime should not be confined because
of this impecuniosity prior to his trial and conviction so long as he
can provide adequate assurance that he will be available to stand
trial when called. 2
It is not unreasonable to impose on the state the burden of proving
that nonfinancial bail alternatives are insufficient to ensure the
defendant's appearance at trial before secured money bail can be
required. State attorneys routinely exercise their prerogative to be
heard on the bail decision and are able to marshal the facts bearing
on that decision. Indeed, the American Bar Association has asserted
that
It should be the policy of prosecuting attorneys to encourage
the release of defendants upon an order to appear or on their own
recognizance. Special efforts should be made to enter into stipula-
tions to that effect in order to avoid unnecessary pretrial release
inquiries and to promote efficiency in the administration of jus-
tice.'"
The Supreme Court of Florida has twice rejected proposals to
promulgate a bail rule which would (1) incorporate a presumption
in favor of pretrial release based on one of a series of nonfinancial
bail alternatives, (2) require the trial court to examine fairly and
exhaust these alternatives prior to imposing secured money bail,
and (3) make secured money bail a last resort." However, some
justices have supported such proposals and criticized their rejection.
In 1972, Justice Richard Ervin refused to support any longer what
he termed "Florida's archaic bail bond system. '45 Ervin chastised
his fellow justices, saying:
42. S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965). For further discussion of a presumption
in favor of nonfinancial conditions of release, see United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169,
171 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Cowper, 349 F. Supp. 560, 562 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United
States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Foote, The Coming Constitutional
Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125, 1180, 1183 (1965); McCree, Bail and the Indigent
Defendant, 1965 U. hLL. L.F. 1, 2.
43. ABA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 25, at 45 (standard 4.3(f)).
44. See The Florida Bar, 343 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1977); In re Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972).
45. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1972) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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If conditions of release were found to be necessary, the Commit-
tee's rule [which was rejected by the court] provided that "the
judicial officer shall impose the least onerous condition reasonably
likely to assure the defendant's appearance in court." Money bail
was a last resort, and even fully secured bail was to be required
only in extreme cases where no other condition would satisfactorily
guarantee the defendant's appearance. In each instance where a
judicial officer or his authorized deputy, or law officer acting under
his authority determined a summons, the defendant's promise to
appear, or personal recognizance to be insufficient to assure the
defendant's presence, the proposed rule required that the judicial
officer give reasons for the imposition of conditions. In determining
what conditions of release would reasonably insure the appearance
of the defendant, the Committee recommended that the judicial
officer take into account factors such as the length of his residence
in the community and his past residences, his employment status
and history, and his financial condition, his family ties and rela-
tionships, his reputation, character, and mental condition; his
prior criminal record, including any record of prior release pending
trial and record of appearance while released, the identity of re-
sponsible members of the community who would vouch for his
reliability and agree to assist him in making required appearances,
the nature of the offense charged, and any other factors indicating
his ties to the community or bearing on the risk of willful failure
to appear.
The Committee's rule was an excellent attempt at eliminating
from our legal system one more means of discriminating against
the poor. It should have been approved."
And, in 1977, Justices Arthur England and Alan Sundberg dissented
from a denial of a request that the revision of its pretrial release rule
require that: (1) the state bear the burden of showing that all nonfi-
nancial alternatives are insufficient to ensure the defendant's ap-
pearance, and (2) money bail be used, especially with regard to
indigents, only when it is found that no other condition will reason-
ably assure the defendant's appearance in court. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
accepted "the principle that imprisonment solely because of indi-
gent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally per-
missible" and "that in the case of an indigent, whose appearance
at trial could reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms
46. Id. at 71-72.
47. The Florida Bar, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1266 (Fla. 1977). See also Pugh v. Rainwater, 572
F.2d 1053, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Simpson, Gewin, Goldberg, Godbold, JJ.,
dissenting).
19781
788 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:775
of release, pretrial confinement for inability to post money bail
would constitute imposition of an excessive restraint. 4 8
The revision proposal, picking up where the dissenting Florida
Supreme Court justices and the Fifth Circuit left off, would, if
passed, guarantee all persons that pretrial freedom will not depend
on their financial resources. Acceptance of the revision by the voters
would trigger the next step in assuring adherence to the constitu-
tional precept-the promulgation of new rules of criminal proce-
dure. However, this step would not be without its problems.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED ARTICLE I, § 14
If the proposed revision of article I, section 14 of the declaration
of rights in the Florida Constitution is approved by the voters in
November, 1978, the focus for bail reform will shift to the Florida
Supreme Court. The courts will have to promulgate procedural
rules to effectuate the rights guaranteed by the new article I, sec-
tion 14, just as it has promulgated rules to effectuate the present
article I, section 14. This part of this article discusses the need for
new rules, their scope, some problems which must be avoided, and
some lessons learned from implementation of the Federal Bail
Reform Act.
A. The Need for New Rules
Rule 3.130(b)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure recog-
nizes the range of release options available to a judge making a
pretrial release decision. 49 The rule also sets forth the relevant fac-
tors to be used to determine "which form of release will reasonably
assure appearance." In both areas, the Florida rule closely follows
the language and direction of the Federal Bail Reform Act and poses
no substantial problems.
Unfortunately, the Florida rule contains no provisions which
would ensure that the burden of showing that money bail is required
to assure the defendant's appearance be placed on the state. Also
missing is any indication of the method by which the state would
discharge such a burden. Since the crucial aspect of the revision
commission's proposal is the creation of a presumption in favor of
release on personal recognizance or other nonfinancial bail alterna-
tive, the rules on pretrial release would have to be amended to
guarantee meaningful implementation of this presumption.
In its present form, rule 3.130(b)(4) instructs the judicial officer
48. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
49. For text of the rule, see note 5 supra.
50. FLA. R. Cram. PRoc. 3.130(b)(4)(iii).
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conducting an initial appearance hearing to "consider all available
relevant factors to determine what form of release is necessary to
assure the defendant's appearance." Those "factors" are enumer-
ated in subsection (b)(4)(iii) of the rule:
ITihe judge shall . .. take into account the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against
the defendant, the defendant's family ties, employment, financial
resources, character and mental condition, the length of his resi-
dence in the community, his record of convictions, and his record
of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution
or failure to appear at court proceedings.5'
Obviously, some of the information relevant to the release deci-
sion, for example, the accused's conviction record, is available to the
state. Some other data, however, can usually be made known only
by the defendant or his counsel-for example, the accused's family
ties and financial resources. Since the burden would be on the state
to show that non-monetary release conditions are inappropriate, a
minor dilemma arises: How is the state to discharge its obligation
without the defendant's cooperation, and, if the defendant cooper-
ates, does that not in effect shift the burden back to him and thus
return us to the present state of pretrial release decisionmaking?
In the shadow of that dilemma, we address the problem of articu-
lating a rule which would protect the guarantee of non-monetary
pretrial release and still protect the state's interest in guaranteeing
a defendant's appearance at trial.
B. The New Rule
The new rule should begin with an explicit statement that non-
monetary conditions of release are to be given absolute priority and
that monetary conditions may be used only if no other method is
adequate for assuring a defendant's appearance at trial.
The rule should also provide guidelines for determining whether
non-monetary conditions will suffice. Perhaps the fairest way to
commence the inquiry would be for the judge to announce to the
defendant that he will be released without the need to post any cash
if the judge believes that, given such a release, the defendant will
appear at all future court proceedings. At that point the court could
inquire into the accused's family ties, employment, length of resi-
dence in the community, character and mental condition, and any
51. Id. at 3.130(b)(4)(ii).
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previous record of appearance or nonappearance at court proceed-
ings. These are the threshold factors most relevant to the release
decision. Thus, the rule should make clear that if the court, after
inquiry into these factors, is satisfied with the accused's assurances,
a recognizance release is appropriate.
In its present form, rule 3.130(b)(4)(iii) requires the judge to con-
sider, in addition to the above-mentioned factors, the weight of the
evidence against the defendant, his financial resources, and his re-
cord of prior convictions. These three considerations, however,
should not be included in the initial stage of any new rule. It should
be apparent that, given the presumption of innocence, the weight
of the evidence is irrelevant. 52 As for financial resources, they be-
come relevant only if a monetary bail must be imposed. Thus, that
line of inquiry is premature at the initial stage of the bail decision.
Finally, prior convictions tell nothing about a person's future ap-
pearance, except-perhaps-that he did appear in earlier cases.
However, the damage done by exposing prior convictions, in terms
of possibly prejudicing the bail decision or even the ultimate fact-
finding process, would severely outweigh the need for that informa-
tion at the initial inquiry stage. Only by limiting the focus of the
initial inquiry would it be possible to ensure the integrity of the
promise of a revised article I, section 14. The new rule should clearly
articulate the first range of questions to be posed to the defendant
as well as the obligation of the judge to order recognizance release
if satisfactory answers are provided.5 3
52. Cf. Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (holding that provision
in FLA. R. CRIM. Pioc. 3.130(a) which denies the right to bail in capital cases where "the proof
of guilt is evident or the presumption is great" denied the plaintiffs fundamental right to be
presumed innocent).
53. The need for a mechanism to verify the information provided by the defendant or his
counsel is obvious. Presently, FLA. STAT. § 903.03(2) (1977), allows judges to request the
Department of Offender Rehabilitation to investigate the factors set out in present rule
3.130(b)(4)(iii):
(2)(a) The Department of Offender Rehabilitation shall have the authority on the
request of a circuit court when a person charged with a noncapital crime or bailable
offense is held, to make an investigation and report to the court, including:
1. The circumstances of the accused's family, employment, financial resources,
character, mental condition, and length of residence in the community;
2. His record of convictions, of appearance at court proceedings, of flight to
avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings; and
3. Other facts that may be needed to assist the court in its determination of the
indigency of the accused and whether he should be released on his own recogniz-
ance.
(b) The court shall not be bound by the recommendations.
A proposed revision of § 903.03, Fla. HB 1775 (1978), would allow a court to "request any
person to make an investigation and report relating to the information needed" for the release
decision. This proposal has the advantage of permitting substantial leeway for the creation
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The new rule should permit the court, if the initial inquiry raises
some doubts about the advisability of personal recognizance release,
to then enlarge its inquiry. However, for the same reason stated
above, inquiry into the financial resources of the defendant should
still be precluded.
By adopting clearly defined steps in the release inquiry process,
such a rule would ensure judicial adherence to the constitutional
mandate. As succinct as the Federal Bail Reform Act is, appellate
courts have found it necessary to remind federal trial courts of the
multistep process involved in conforming to the Act:
The threshold determination to be made, under § 3146(a), is
whether release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance
bond, without imposition of any further conditions, will reasonably
assure appearance, and only after that inquiry is answered in the
negative does the focus switch to conditions to be imposed alterna-
tively or in addition to the method of personal recognizance or
unsecured bond."
Since the Florida courts would be fulfilling the commands of the
Florida Constitution, it would be essential to avoid confusion about
the appropriateness of specific actions at each level of the release
inquiry process.
If, because of tenuous ties to the community, family, or employ-
ment, or because the defendant exhibited some kind of emotional
instability, the court felt that recognizance release was inappro-
priate, then the inquiry could be broadened. At that stage the court
should be allowed to inquire into the defendant's financial resources
to determine if an unsecured personal recognizance release might be
appropriate.55 If such a release is deemed inappropriate, perhaps
because the defendant has limited financial resources, only then
should the court be allowed to broaden its inquiry to explore facts
relevant to determining whether only non-monetary forms of release
might serve to secure the release and future appearance of the ac-
of independent bail agancies which might be able to perform the investigative tasks more
effectively (because of their lack of involvement in the criminal justice process) and more
rapidly.
54. United States v. Cramer, 451 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1971).
55. While the Federal Bail Reform Act equates an unsecured personal recognizance bond
with release on recognizance, the Florida bail provision places an unsecured personal recog-
nizance bond in a slightly inferior position. Since the clear intention of the proposed revision
is to limit the relevancy of monetary wealth as a criteria for release, simple recognizance
releases should be the most preferred method of release. The court should move beyond
personal recognizance only if such a release may not be effective to guarantee appearance at
trial.
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cused. It is at this point that the nature and weight of the evidence,
the defendant's prior convictions, and similar information should be
explored.
Throughout the entire decisionmaking process, there should be no
difficulty with the defendant and his counsel's offering their assis-
tance to the court by providing factual data and fashioning non-
monetary alternatives to money bail. Indeed, counsel (and the
court) should be diligent and imaginative in attempting to design
such alternatives.2
Therefore, while it may seem anomalous to place a defendant in
the position where he must provide the relevant data justifying non-
monetary release when a constitutional provision clearly entitles the
defendant to the presumption of such a release, the fact is that it is
the defendant or defense counsel who is in the best position to
present those facts quickly. By requiring the judicial officer to con-
duct a step-by-step analysis and by forcing consideration of specific
and simple forms of release before moving on to more restrictive
forms, the new rule would protect that presumption of release in
favor of the defendant. It would remain the state's burden to show
that non-monetary forms of release would not suffice. Thus, as the
court approached the point at which complicated release conditions
might be imposed, the state would be forced to play a more active
role-if it desired to meet its burden successfully.
Before examining the ultimate issue of how the state might prove
that non-monetary conditions are insufficient, we will discuss the
serious issues raised by release provisions which, while they do not
involve money, do implicate significant liberty interests.
C. Dangers in the Range of New Monetary Release Alternatives
Beyond Release on Recognizance and Unsecured Personal
Recognizance Bonds
Some defendants with limited financial resources may prefer to
use those resources rather than suffer the restrictions which might
56. To that end, any new rule should retain the flexible language of present rule
3.130(b)(4)(i)(6):
(i) The purpose of bail is to insure the defendant's appearance. For the purpose
of this rule, bail is defined as any of the following forms of release:
(6) Imposing any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap-
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the defendant return to
custody after specified hours.
See also Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (a)(5) (1976).
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be imposed in lieu of money bail to guarantee their future appear-
ances.
The present Florida rule suggests alternatives which seriously in-
fringe upon fundamental constitutional rights." "Placing the defen-
dant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing
to supervise him"58 involves a restraint on liberty. Whether or not
the custody is a "significant restraint"59 will depend on future inter-
pretations of the rule's language and the specific custodial arrange-
ments. Similarly, "[p]lacing restrictions on the travel, association,
or place of abode of the defendant" 0 touches on obvious funda-
mental constitutional guarantees such as the right to travel,8" the
right to associate,"2 and the right of privacy. 3 While similar restric-
tions have been approved under the Federal Bail Reform Act as
legitimate methods to assure appearance," courts must remain cog-
nizant of the need to balance competing interests-such as ensuring
an accused's right to pretrial release, protecting an accused's other
constitutional guarantees, and ensuring that the state's interest in
future appearance is protected. 5
The range of possible conditions of release is so great that courts
must not lose sight of their ultimate goal-use of the least restrictive
alternative short of monetary bail to effectuate pretrial release.6
Therefore, it is imperative that the new rules contain language mak-
ing the least restrictive alternative the preferred mode of pretrial
release. By so doing, the rule would also protect against possible
state efforts to employ restrictive non-monetary release conditions
to limit a defendant's freedoms indirectly-something that it would
no longer be able to accomplish directly by requesting bail which is
so high that it is tantamount to no bail at all.6
57. See note 5 supra for text of the rule.
58. FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.130(b)(4)(i)(3).
59. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
60. FLA. R. CRiM. PRoc. 3.130(b)(4)(i)(4).
61. See cases cited note 19 supra.
62. See cases cited note 20 supra.
63. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. See United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
65. The need for recognition of this balance is especially crucial when the court applies
an open-ended provision which allows for the creation of new, ad hoc conditions of release.
See note 56 supra.
66. A judicial imprimatur has even been given to "work-release" conditions which allow
a presumably innocent person to reside in jail while working during the day. United States
v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Usually such a program is reserved for those
already convicted. It seems that if a person is faced with the option of using the money he
makes to post a bond or being in a pretrial work-release program, the former is a less onerous
method of assuring future appearances, and the accused should have that choice.
67. As more restrictions are placed on a defendant's liberty, the state may believe it is
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D. Shifting the Burden to the State
Under the proposed new rule which is outlined above, the burden
would very subtly shift to the state at the point that release on
recognizance or unsecured personal recognizance bonds are rejected
by the court as methods of guaranteeing future appearances. As the
court begins to move toward monetary bail, the state's interest in
the proceeding increases, for some doubt has been expressed about
the likelihood of the accused's voluntary future return to court.
While the proposed constitutional revision would not shift the bur-
den squarely to the state until the issue of monetary bail came into
clear focus, the presumptions against monetary bail and in favor of
the least restrictive alternative requirement would necessitate ei-
ther state acquiescence in or objection to the less restrictive release
conditions. At the point when the state chose to object, the burden
would shift to the state to explain and justify its position. Of course,
if the state contended from the outset that non-monetary release
would not suffice, it would have the burden from the outset to
justify its contentions.
Granted, it would be difficult to isolate the moment at which the
burden would shift. In a rapidly evolving court proceeding in which
the state has not taken an adverse position from the outset, it is
important that the moment be identified as clearly as possible in
order to prevent a court from placing on the defendant the burden
of showing why he should be released on non-monetary conditions.
In addition, the new rule should require the state to announce its
position on whether it will seek monetary bail at the point when the
court rejects release on recognizance or unsecured personal recogniz-
ance bond. Such a requirement would ensure that the court would
be made aware of the state's concerns. As a result, the court, the
defendant, and the defendant's counsel would be better able to
tailor non-monetary release conditions successfully.
Ultimately the state, if it desires to oppose non-monetary release
and seek imposition of monetary conditions, would have to show
that "no other method [of release] is adequate" ' to assure the
defendant's future appearances. To do that, the state might at-
tempt to prove that the defendant has told others he would not
appear, that he has had made plans for an extended trip out of the
country, or that he has recently sold his property in the area. The
meeting some perceived need to protect the public from danger. However laudable that goal
may be, it is not the test for pretrial release, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), and the notion
of preventive detention has been rejected as antithetical to democratic concepts of liberty.
68. See proposed art. I, § 14, quoted in text accompanying note 10 supra.
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number of reasons for which the state may legitimately oppose re-
lease on non-monetary conditions is limitless. But it would be essen-
tial that the rule provide, and that courts understand, that the test
for release would not be "absolute certainty" that a defendant
would appear. All that a court could seek would be "reasonable"
assurance of future appearances." The revised article I, section 14
speaks in terms of "conditions reasonable under the circumstan-
ces." There is no way ever to guarantee absolute certainty of appear-
ance. Even money bail does not provide that certainty. There is no
reason to expect non-monetary conditions of relief to do so.70
E. The Evidentiary Rules
Rule 3.130(b)(4)(iv) now provides: "Information stated in, or of-
fered in connection with any order entered pursuant to this rule
need not strictly conform to the rules of evidence." The federal view
is similar: "[Elvidence at [bail] hearings need not conform to the
rules pertaining to the admissability of evidence in a court of law."'
These tolerant views of evidentiary requirements are consistent with
the similar approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in
setting evidentiary standards for determining probable cause.,,
While there are grave dangers for defendants in probable cause
determinations, for release purposes the tolerant attitude toward
evidence has both positive and negative connotations for the defen-
dant and the state.
Since it is essential that a release decision be speedy to protect
the defendant's interests, and since the state must be protected
from rash release decisions based on erroneous information, there
must be a balanced approach which ensures quick access to reliable
facts. Permitting informal presentation of information about the
accused's background and family ties, combined with corroborative
data (such as car registration, warranty deeds, voter registrations,
paycheck stubs, and the like) should protect the state's interests
and still permit speedy resolution of the release conditions decision.
As cases become more difficult and more restrictive release condi-
69. United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70. There is a special irony in saying that if non-monetary conditions are insufficient to
provide reasonable assurances, the court can turn to money bail. Such an approach would
be nothing less than a return to the situation of a high-risk rich person's being able to buy
his freedom while a high-risk poor person remains incarcerated-which raises troublesome
equal protection issues.
71. United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 1975). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3146(f)
(1976).
72. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1975).
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tions are considered, the need for speed remains constant. But the
need for reliable data increases. Since the more onerous conditions
can involve significant restraints on liberty and on other fundamen-
tal rights, it is essential that great care be observed in the eviden-
tiary process leading to a determination of release conditions. For
example, one would be hard pressed to justify a high monetary bond
solely on hearsay relating to a third party's assertion that the ac-
cused said he would not appear. In one of the few cases dealing with
similar problems, United States v. Wind, the United States Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that while some of the evidence
presented to the lower court concerning the danger of releasing the
defendant was hearsay, other substantial evidence justified the
lower court's decision to set a high bond.73 The case, however, pre-
sented another unique feature: an in camera hearing excluding the
defendant and his counsel. That method of presenting evidence was
struck down.'
Consequently, the implementing rule should contain the safe-
guard of a more stringent evidentiary standard than that which now
prevails. This will be necessary if the court imposes conditions
which, although non-monetary, significantly interfere with liberty,
or if the court imposes monetary conditions of release. At a mini-
mum, the new rule should require "reliable" evidence to justify the
imposition of conditions of release more onerous than release on
recognizance or release on unsecured personal recognizance bonds.
F. The Need for Written Reasons for the Imposition of Certain
Conditions
If a court imposes nonfinancial conditions of release to which the
defendant objects, or financial conditions of release to which he
objects or is unable to meet, a recitation of the reasons for imposi-
tion of those conditions is an essential safeguard for effective judi-
cial review. The present rule permits review by a trial court if a
committing magistrate without trial jurisdiction sets excessive re-
lease conditions, or review by habeas corpus if the trial court's order
73. 527 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1975).
74. The principal issue in Wind was whether the trial court properly considered evidence
that "Wind would flee if released, regardless of bail, and would pose a danger to witnesses
and to the community," in deciding to remand him to custody without bail. Id. at 673. The
court decided that consideration of such evidence and institution of such action was indeed
proper.
The state's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process is probably the one
interest which can justify a court's exercising its inherent power to protect that process by
imposing difficult release conditions. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (1962) (Doug-
las, J.).
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is excessive. 5 But no appellate review is truly effective unless the
reviewing court has the benefit of written reasons for the decision it
reviews.
The federal statute requires written reasons if the defendant is
unable to meet the conditions within twenty-four hours of their
imposition .7  Requiring written reasons would serve two purposes.
First, it would enhance judicial review. Second, it would deter
judges from making hasty, unreasoned decisions about release. The
latter effect may be more important than the former. But, in either
case, written reasons would be essential for ensuring that the Flor-
ida constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to non-
monetary, less restrictive conditions of pretrial release would be
followed by trial courts and protected by appellate courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new article I, section 14, if adopted by the voters, would be
an important step toward remedying inequities in pretrial release
which have concerned courts and commentators for decades." The
crucial decisions applying the constitutional precept would be made
by trial courts and committing magistrates. It would be essential
that these judges be provided with clear, specific guidelines for their
decisions.
75. FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.130(c).
76. (d) A person for whom conditions of release are imposed and who after
twenty-four hours from the time of the release hearing continues to be detained as
a result of his inability to meet the conditions of release, shall, upon application,
be entitled to have the conditions reviewed by the judicial officer who imposed
them. Unless the conditions of release are amended and the person is thereupon
released, the judicial officer shall set forth in writing the reasons for requiring the
conditions imposed. A person who is ordered released on a condition which requires
that he return to custody after specified hours shall, upon application, be entitled
to a review by the judicial officer who imposed the condition. Unless the require-
ment is removed and the person is thereupon released on another condition, the
judicial officer shall set forth in writing the reasons for continuing the requirement.
In the event that the judicial officer who imposed conditions of release is not
available, any other judicial officer in the district may review such conditions.
(e) A judicial officer ordering the release of a person on any condition specified
in this section may at any time amend his order to impose additional or different
conditions of release: Provided, That, if the imposition of such additional or differ-
ent conditions results in the detention of the person as a result of his inability to
meet such conditions or in the release of the person on a condition requiring him
to return to custody after specified hours, the provisions of subsection (d) shall
apply.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(d)-(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); Wisot-
sky, Use of a Master Bond Schedule: Equal Justice Under Law?, 24 U. MImi L. REv. 808
(1970); Note, Bail and Its Discrimination Against the Poor: A Civil Rights Action as a Vehicle
of Reform, 9 VAL. U.L. REv. 167 (1974).
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New rules of criminal procedure would establish those guidelines.
It would be imperative that in promulgating those rules, the Florida
Supreme Court recognize that by adopting the new bail provision,
the people of the State of Florida have cast their vote for the pre-
sumption of innocence, for equal protection of the poor, and for
liberty and justice. Carefully drafted criteria for implementing that
choice would assure that the people's will would be the law in every
court in Florida.
